Past Facebook posts. Not updated.
MY TAKE on the NEWS. “A World Away From Ukraine, Russia Is Courting Latin America.” And adds: “The Ukraine crisis has revived a struggle over Latin America between the U.S. and Russia, as Vladimir V. Putin seeks greater influence in the region.” Pretty much like Asia, Latin America’s stand on the Ukraine crisis is ambivalent, if not diverse or vague. Yet no Latin/Asian country has shipped or vowed military aid to Kiev, unlike most European nations.
Meantime, before all these blew up, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov made an indirect threat that Russia could not rule out deploying military forces to its allies Venezuela and Cuba, as he highlighted Moscow’s clout in the Western Hemisphere. Yet even as violence carries on, most of Latin/South America stay generally neutral.
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro reiterates that his country is maintaining neutrality in the conflict. “We are not going to take sides. We are going to continue to be neutral and help however possible to find a solution,” he said. Brazil has deep economic ties with Moscow, mostly by way of oil and fertilizer.
Mr Ryabkov’s dare wasn’t the first time that the Kremlin issued a warning. In 2008, during the conflict over Russia-backed separatists in Georgia, Russia first deployed Tu-160 nuclear-capable bombers to Venezuela, later followed by four warships. Russia sent its Tu-160 bombers back to the region again in 2013 as the United States and European Union pressured the country over its support of separatist forces in Ukraine.
And as President Biden pounds on President Putin some more with a U.S. ban on Russian oil imports on Tuesday (3/8/2022), expect a more equally damning response from the Kremlin. Peace seems to be losing its mojo. 🇧🇷🇷🇺🇦🇷
DURING Donald Trump’s tenure at White House, Washington was able to regain lost ground in Venezuela without a bloody “regime change” following massive anti-Nicolas Maduro protests in Caracas. But that doesn’t mean the country with a massive oil reserve is all-American. Ideologically, Venezuela is still a Russian advocate. Hugo Chávez and his successor Maduro are Russia’s most reliable allies for projecting force into the region.
Take note: Russia’s position in Venezuela is arguably among the largest and most strategically significant of its positions in the region. The two key axes of the Moscow/Caracas relationship have been arms sales and oil.
With respect to arms, from 2006 through the death of Chávez in 2013, Russia sold over $11 billion in arms to Venezuela, including T-72 tanks, BMP-3 and BTR-80 armored vehicles, Su-30 fighters, Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters, and other military end items, making Venezuela by far Russia’s largest military partner in the region. The two countries also agreed to establish a rifle factory in Venezuela, although the project has suffered significant delays due to corruption and other problems.
As the political and fiscal crisis of the Venezuelan regime deepened and its ability to pay its bills diminished, Russia’s military engagement shifted from the purchase of new end items to maintenance, upgrades, training, and other types of support.
Enter petroleum. Chávez practically led Russia's oil giants with open arms: Gazprom, TNK, Lukoil, and Surgutneftegas, and later Rosneft. But as the Venezuelan economy collapsed under Maduro, most of Russia’s energy biggies left or lessened investments. 🇧🇷🇷🇺🇦🇷
NICARAGUA has long been one of Russia’s key partners in the region, with the relationship centered on the bond with leader Daniel Ortega and the Sandinista movement (FSLN), which the Soviet Union armed and helped bring to power in 1979. Ortega rekindled the relationship when he returned to office in 2007, and his government was the first in the region to diplomatically recognize the Russian-backed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia when they broke away from the Republic of Georgia in 2008.
Over the next 14 years, Russian support for the Ortega regime grew from donations of buses and foodstuffs to Mi-17 helicopters, Yak-130 fighter trainers, An-26 medium transport aircraft, TIGR armored cars, T-72 tanks, ZU-23 anti aircraft guns, and an array of older Russian armored vehicles, as well as Mizrah patrol craft and Molina missile boats.
Russian cooperation also included setting up a downlink facility for the Russian GLONASS satellite system, inaugurated in 2017, and a Russian regional training facility in Managua for the Russian counterdrug organization FSKN. The FSKN facility in Nicaragua offers Russian operatives the opportunity to interact with police officials from across Central America who would not normally send officers to Russia for training. 🇧🇷🇷🇺🇦🇷
CUBA. Russian military engagement with and arms sales to Cuba have been limited since the abrupt cutoff of Russian aid in 1993 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Russian firms were still involved in the Cuban petroleum sector, in nickel mining, and in the transportation sector. Russia has sent 1000 minibuses and 50 trains to Cuba, and it sells Lada cars and Kamaz trucks to the island, among other goods.
Peru. Russia has had a special relationship with the Peruvian military, and particularly its army, since the presidency of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975), a left-wing general who seized power in a coup d’état. Alvarado followed through with a shipment of Soviet arms initially intended for the Chilean government of Salvador Allende. Older generation Peruvian arms included Mi-8, Mi-24, and later Mi-17 helicopters, and T-55 tanks. Peru also purchased Su-22 fighter bombers and Su-25 fixed-wing aircraft from the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which the country later used against Ecuador during the Cenepa War of 1995.
Argentina. Russia’s role as a purchaser of Argentine grain and beef has opened a door in the relationship between the two countries, even under right-of-center and military governments. The left wing of the Peronist movement in Argentina, including former President and current Vice President Christina Fernández de Kirchner, has entertained military relations with Russia. Argentina has contemplated buying Russian fighter aircraft in both 2015 and again in 2021, including Mig-29s and Su-30s. Nonetheless, it has yet to consummate a major arms deal. 🇧🇷🇷🇺🇦🇷
OTHERS. Beyond those mentioned, other potential Russian partners in the region are Xiomara Castro in Honduras, Gabriel Boric in Chile, Luis Arce in Bolivia, and if former guerrilla Gustavo Petro wins in Colombia in the nation’s May 2022 elections.
Chinese money remains an enabling factor in all these, as expected. Russia’s economy, with a gross domestic product of $1.48 trillion, is only a tenth of the size of China’s $14.7 trillion GDP. Moreover, Russia’s economy is far less diversified and more dependent on earnings from oil exports, which are subject to significant fluctuations. Correspondingly, Russia’s ability to provide significant quantities of military hardware or fund other projects on credit to partners in the region for an extended period is limited.
And so Beijing comes in. Given Vladimir Putin’s resolve, at this point, to prolong his military operations in Ukraine, Xi Jinping stays conveniently here or there, but that is a classic CCP stance. And we know where Beijing’s allegiance is—although I see China favoring an end to hostilities, prolonged war means prolonged delay of work.
Which goes to say, the most credible power that could convince Russia to end its aggression in Ukraine is China. We don’t want this mess to rub off in South America or elsewhere. Bad for business. 🇧🇷🇷🇺🇦🇷
